ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the environmental integrity, the nature and the political relevance of the Copenhagen Accord. According to the first two parameters, the Copenhagen Accord is not satisfactory. From a political point of view the conclusion is slightly different, albeit not positive. This paper concludes arguing that after the Copenhagen Conference the future of the international climate change legal regime is likely to be more fragmented, the Accord being one further piece of the global carbon puzzle.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework More than 50.000 participants were accredited and 120 Heads of State and Governments participated in the high level segment making the Copenhagen Conference the highest profile meeting of any multilateral environmental agreement. In this paper I will focus only on the Copenhagen Accord and, in particular, on how it deals with mitigation. I will assess it from an environmental, legal and political point of view in order to draw some conclusions on the future of the international climate change regime 1 .
II. THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD
International climate change negotiations have followed two parallel tracks in the last years: one under the UNFCCC and the other under the Kyoto Protocol. The first track was launched in Bali, at the thirteenth COP of the UNFCCC, and countries were meant to devise ways to achieve "full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012" Both tracks should have ended at the Copenhagen Conference, but it was clear in the meetings prior to COP15 and COP/MOP5 that this would not be achieved 4 . While some countries, and the EU in particular, were aiming for a new legally binding international treaty, still there was hope to be able to secure, at least, a range of COP decisions that would have been able to guide the negotiations further in the aftermath of Copenhagen.
These hopes were also frustrated when, at the end of the two weeks of negotiations, a rather small (albeit influential) group of countries was able to broker the Copenhagen Accord, which is not a COP decision. Decision -/CP.15 "takes note of the Copenhagen Accord".
1 In this brief I will not be providing a complete analysis of the negotiations that have taken place during the two weeks in Copenhagen. For a detailed study of the latter see WEMAËRE M., "State of play of the international climate change negotiations: what are the results of the Copenhagen Conference?", Carbon and Climate Law Review, no. 4.1, 2010, pp. 106-111 ; DUBASH N.K., "Copenhagen: Climate of Mistrust", Economic and Political Weekly, no. 52, 2009, pp. 8-11 . Nor will I focus on how the Copenhagen Accord deals with adaptation, reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) and finance, which feature prominently in the document; see § 3 for adaptation, § 6 for REDD; § 8 for finance, including the establishment of a High Level Panel and of the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, respectively at § 9 and 10.
I will now move on and assess the Copenhagen Accord from an environmental, legal and political parameter in order to determine whether the outcomes of the talks in Copenhagen can be hailed as a success or a failure.
The environmental integrity of the Copenhagen Accord
For an international regime to properly tackle climate change it needs to meet the final objective of the UNFCCC, which is to prevent dangerous climate change 5 . According to most scientific reports an overall increase in the world's temperature above 1.5 degrees will lead to dangerous climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has suggested in its Fourth Assessment Report that a reduction in the range of 25 to 40% from 1990 levels is needed in order to avoid this 6 . Does the Copenhagen Accord set this environmental target and does it provide the necessary tools to achieve it?
The answer is no. On the one hand, the goal of the States that have affiliated themselves to the Copenhagen Accord is not to limit the overall temperature increase to 1.5 degrees, but "to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius" 7 . One has to acknowledge that countries were aware that "deep cuts in global emissions are required according to science", 8 but no mention of specific cuts has been included in the Copenhagen Accord. Furthermore, by making an explicit reference to the need for revising the Copenhagen Accord in 2015 in order to consider ways to achieve a maximum increase of 1.5 degrees 9 , the document shows a current lack of ambition from an environmental perspective. In sum, contrary to the Kyoto Protocol where a specific cap was established 5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) (1992), 31 ILM 822, art. 2: "The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. . This bottom up approach is the content of the so called "pledges" that all countries that decide to affiliate themselves to the Copenhagen Accord were asked to submit to the UNFCCC Secretariat by 31 January 2010
13
. Annexes II and III of this article include excerpts of the pledges from key States, whose action in relation to climate change mitigation will be critical to tackle climate change efficiently.
Leaving aside for the moment the nature of these pledges, the environmental integrity of a regime based on the Copenhagen Accord would depend on whether the compliance with the emissions reductions level provided for in the pledges would actually limit an overall increase in temperatures to 2.0 degrees (or even better, 1.5 degrees). This does not seem to be the case. On the one hand, the first analysis of the pledges shows that, even if they were complied with, they would not deliver the necessary emission reductions needed to avoid On the other hand, the Copenhagen Accord does not mention the compliance system provided for in the Kyoto Protocol
18
, which has been hailed as one of the most advanced of any MEA. 19 The Enforcement Branch of the latter has the power to take measures against countries found in non compliance with their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol 20 . In the Copenhagen Accord "compliance" becomes "measurement, report and verification (MRV)", which seems to be structured in three different ways depending on whose mitigation action is considered. First, climate change mitigation action enshrined in pledges from Annex I countries will be "measured, reported and verified in accordance with existing and any further guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties" by Non-Annex I Parties will be subject to their domestic measurement, reporting and verification the result of which will be reported through their national communications every two years" 22 . Finally, non Annex I countries can also decide to adopt mitigation action, which will be supported by international assistance. In this third instance the Copenhagen Accord establishes that: "[T]hese supported nationally appropriate mitigation actions will be subject to international measurement, reporting and verification in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties"
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.
Two comments can be made on the MRV system provided for in the Copenhagen Accord.
On the one hand, both for mitigation action taken by Annex I countries and for supported climate change mitigation action by Non Annex I countries the system requires further development through the COP. In other words, the system, as it currently stands, is not 
The political relevance of the Copenhagen Accord
One can argue that the main weakness of the Kyoto Protocol has been the failure to have on board the -until very recently -biggest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions (the US) and the fact that it did not set any emission reduction obligations for developing countries with emerging economies (countries like China or Brazil).
Obviously, this has nothing to do with the MEA itself, but, on the one hand, with the unwillingness of the previous US administration to commit itself to the Kyoto Protocol, even if under the Clinton administration it had actively participated in the shaping of the Kyoto Protocol, and of its flexible mechanisms in particular. On the other hand, developing countries were not asked to commit to any specific emission reduction obligations in application of the principle of the common but differentiated responsibilities, which is a More than the voluntary nature of the obligations, which would not be a problem should there be real political will to tackle climate change, what is worrying is the "conditional" nature of these obligations. The moment one country considers that the variables needed to take action are no longer present, it will feel free to downsize its climate change mitigation action in detriment of the effectiveness of the international climate change regime. In other words, it is very easy to foresee that the ice on which the Copenhagen Accord stands may easily break, since this will happen when even just one key country does not comply with voluntary targets it has set itself, possibly leading to a domino effect because of competitiveness concerns.
In sum, while a first look at the Copenhagen Accord may seem positive from a political point of view since it enables the US and key emerging developing countries, such as China In this paper on the Copenhagen Accord we position ourselves somewhere in the middle.
We do not go so far as to say that it a "rotten" document, but we also do not believe that it can be considered "a significant breakthrough".
We have argued that the Copenhagen Accord can be assessed under environmental, legal and political parameters. Our conclusion is that it clearly fails under the first two parameters, while a preliminary analysis may seem to provide a more positive conclusion if assessed solely from a political point of view.
From an environmental point of view, the Copenhagen Accord fails because, even if pledges were complied with, overall increase in average temperatures will not be limited to Copenhagen Accord will be an important stepping stone for those countries that have affiliated themselves to it, but I am sceptical as to whether it will become the key framework of the future international climate change legal regime.
My impression is that we are moving towards an increasingly fragmented scenario where, in the short term, the two negotiating tracks under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol will need to find ways to coexist with those negotiations that will have to start in order to make the Copenhagen Accord truly operational, if there is political will to do so.
In the long term, the scenario may become even more complex with key countries becoming more and more uncomfortable with the painstaking process of international negotiations and deciding to pursue bilateral and regional routes to tackle climate change.
At the same time, these countries will also start to consider arrangements with other key players (not only States, but business in particular) to advance new carbon markers through sectoral carbon trading and REDD (or REDD similar) mechanisms.
Whether the future international climate change legal regime will be fragmented or not, only time will tell. There is an inherent risk if this occurs, which is to lose sight of the fact that climate change is a "global" phenomenon. Only a strong and common response from RCDA Vol. I -Núm. 1 (2010) The Have agreed on this Copenhagen Accord which is operational immediately.
1. We underline that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time.
We emphasise our strong political will to urgently combat climate change in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, we shall, recognizing the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius, on the basis ofequity and in the context of sustainable development, enhance our long-term cooperative action to combat climate change. We recognize the critical impacts of climate change and the potential impacts of response measures on countries particularly vulnerable to its adverse effects and stress the need to establish a comprehensive adaptation programme including international support.
2. We agree that deep cuts in global emissions are required according to science, and as documented by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, and take action to meet this objective consistent with science and on the basis of equity. We should cooperate in achieving the peaking of global and national emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that the time frame for peaking will be longer in developing countries and bearing in mind that social and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries and that a low-emission development strategy is indispensable to sustainable development.
3. Adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change and the potential impacts of response measures is a challenge faced by all countries. Enhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation is urgently required to ensure the implementation of the Convention by enabling and supporting the implementation of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience in developing countries, especially in those that are particularly vulnerable, especially least developed countries, small island developing States and Africa. We agree that developed countries shall provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, technology and capacity-building to support the implementation of adaptation action in developing countries. defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions seeking international support will be recorded in a registry along with relevant technology, finance and capacity building support. Those actions supported will be added to the list in appendix II. These supported nationally appropriate mitigation actions will be subject to international measurement, reporting and verification in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties.
6. We recognize the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas emission by forests and agree on the need to provide positive incentives to such actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries.
7. We decide to pursue various approaches, including opportunities to use markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote mitigation actions. Developing countries, especially those with low emitting economies should be provided incentives to continue to develop on a low emission pathway. • the global agreement sets the world on a pathway to limit temperature rise to not more than 2° C;
• developed countries make comparable efforts to those of New Zealand;
• advanced and major emitting developing countries take action fully commensurate with their respective capabilities;
• there is an effective set of rules for land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF); and
• there is full recourse to a broad and efficient international carbon market. South Africa South Africa reiterates that it will take nationally appropriate mitigation actions to enable a 34% deviation below the 'Business As Usual' emission growth trajectory by 2020 and a 42% deviation below the 'Business As Usual' emission growth trajectory by 2025. In accordance with article 4.7 of the Convention, the extent to which this action will be implemented depends on the provisions of financial resources, the transfer of technology and capacity building support by developed countries.
Therefore, the above actions requires the finalisation of an ambitious, fair, effective and binding multilateral agreement under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol at COP 16 and CMP6 in
Mexico to enable the delivery of this support.
